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Seasonal Accommodation and
the Financial Crises of the
Great Depression: Did the Fed
“Furnish an Elastic Currency?”
It was not by accident that most of the money panics in this country occurred in the
fall of the year; it was in the fall that the usual seasonal strain, added to an unusual
credit and currency stringency, became the last straw that broke the camel’s back.
—W. Randolph Burgess (1936), p. 206.
EGINNING WITH THE stock market crash
in October 1929, the United States suffered a
series of financial crises that mark the Great
Depression. In each crisis, the number of bank
failures and the declines in bank reserves, the
money stock and economic activity were greater
than in the preceding episodes. Many researchers
investigating the causes of financial crises during
the Great Depression have blamed the Federal
Reserve, for either pursuing policies that led to
crises or for failing to respond to them ap-
propriately.’
This article investigates a recent claim by Mi-
ron (1986) that the reappearance of financial
crises in 1929 was caused by a reduction in the
Fed’s accommodation of seasonal currency and
credit demands! The following three types of
evidence are examined: the Fed’s procedures for
supplying currency and bank reserves across
seasons, the stability of the seasonal behavior of
the Fed’s policy tools and the seasonal behavior
of market interest rates. The Fed’s accommoda-
tion of seasonal demands was passive, suggest-
ing that a deliberate change in seasonal policy
1See, for example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Chandler
(1971), Miron (1986) and Wicker (1966). The continuing de-
bate about the role of Federal Reserve policy during the
Great Depression generally is reviewed by Wheelock
(1992).
‘Miron (1986, p. 136) argues that “the Fed accommodated
the seasonal demands in financial markets to a lesser ex-
tent during the 1929-33 period than it had previously. This
means that the frequency of panics should have increased,
as it did” (Miron’s emphasis).was unlikely. Statistical analysis of the seasonal
patterns of the Fed’s policy tools and of market
outcomes suggests further that no change in
seasonal policy occurred. The Federal Reserve
may rightly be criticized for failing to offset
dramatic nonseasonal increases in currency and
reserve demand during the Depression. It ap-
pears unlikely, however, that the financial crises
were caused by a change in the System’s
seasonal policies.
The first sections of this article discuss the ob-
jectives of the Fed’s founders, particularly with
regard to seasonal accommodation, and describe
how Fed officials implemented those objectives.
A review of how the Fed’s presence affected the
seasonal pattern of interest rates and the fre-
quency of financial crises follows. Finally the ar-
ticle examines whether a change in seasonal
policy was a likely cause of the reappearance of
crises in t929, first focusing on the Fed’s proce-
dures and then on statistical evidence pertaining
to the seasonal patterns of Fed tools and market
outcomes.





The Federal Reserve was founded to correct
banking system flaws that reformers believed
contributed to financial crises. The National
Banking era, which began with the National
Bank Act of 1863 and ended with the opening
of the Federal Reserve Banks in November 1914,
was marked by recurrent crises. Often a crisis
was touched off by a sudden international gold
outflow or the failure of a major financial insti-
tution. Occasionally such an event triggered a
general run by bank depositors seeking to con-
vert deposits into currency. In extreme cases,
banks were forced to suspend currency pay-
rnents and call loans to protect their reserves.
National Banking era crises were generally
characterized by high interest rates, many bank
failures, and a slowing of economic activity.’
Studies of financial crises during the National
Banking era noted that crises generally occurred
at times of the year when demands for currency
and credit reached seasonal peaks. In his study
for the National Monetary Commission, Kem-
merer (1910, pp. 222—23) wrote the following:
It has been found that the two periods of the
year in which the money market is most likely
to be strained are the periods of the ‘spring
revival,’ about March, April, and early May, and
that of the crop-moving demand in the fall; and
that the two periods of easiest money market
are the ‘readjustment’ period, extending from
about the middle of January to nearly the 1st
of March, and the period of the summer
depression, extending through the three sum-
mer months. Of the eight panics [of the era],
four occurred in the fall or early winter ... and
these four included two of the three really se-
vere panics of the period (i.e., those of 1873
and 1907); three occurred in May ... and one,
probably the least important, ... extended from
March until well along in November.
The evidence accordingly points to a tendency
for panics to occur during the seasons normally
characterized by stringent money markets. This
does not mean that the seasonal stringencies
are the causes of the panics; it does mean that
the months in which they occur are the weakest
links in the seasonal chain, and that in periods
of extraordinary tension the chain breaks at
these links.
Reformers attributed the crises of the National
Banking era to inelasticity in the nation’s cur-
rency supply. National bank notes, U.S. govern-
ment currency issued during the Civil War
(Greenbacks), silver certificates and specie (gold
coin) were the principal currency forms during
the National Banking era. Federally chartered
(national) banks were permitted to issue notes
valued at up to 90% (later 100%) of the face
value of U.S. government bonds they pledged
with the Comptroller of the Currency. The sup-
ply of national bank notes was thus tied to the
volume of government bonds outstanding and
the profits national banks could earn issuing
notes using these bonds as security. The sup-
3There is no generally accepted definition of financial crisis.
Rather than defining the term, researchers often list
characteristics of financial crises (for example, Bordo,
1986). According to Schwartz (1986, p. Ii), “A financial cri-
sis is fueled by fears that means of payment will be unob-
tainable at any price and, in a fractional-reserve banking
system, leads to a scramble for high-powered money. It is
precipitated by actions of the public that suddenly squeeze
the reserves of the banking system. In a futile attempt to
restore reserves, the banks may call loans, refuse to roll
over existing loans, or resort to selling assets.” Schwartz
distinguishes between real crises, in which financial dis-
tress leads to a sudden decline in the money supply, and
pseudo-crises, which do not have money supply conse-
quences. Kindleberger (1989), however, argues against
such a distinction. This article uses the terms crisis and
panic interchangeably. See Sprague (1910) for an overview
of financial crises during the National Banking era and
Dwyer and Gilbert (1989) for a study of the effects of bank-
ing panics in this era.plies of Greenbacks and silver certificates were
fixed, as was the supply of specie for short peri-
ods. The currency supply was thus relatively in-
flexible and could not be increased sufficiently
to accommodate a sudden large-scale attempt by
depositors to convert funds into cash. A means
of supplying large amounts of currency rapidly
was key to most banking reform proposals.~
Reformers proposed a system in which the sup-
plies of currency and credit fluctuated with the
needs of trade. The theoretical justification for
such a system became known as the Real Bills
Doctrine, and that doctrine was implemented
with passage of the Federal Reserve Act.5
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The title of the Federal Reserve Act states that
one purpose of the Federal Reserve System is
“to furnish an elastic currency.” Member com-
mercial banks were required to hold reserve
deposits with the Federal Reserve Banks instead
of holding specie or deposits with Central
Reserve City and Reserve City banks, as they
had under the National Banking System. The
Federal Reserve Act also provided for a new
currency form—the Federal Reserve note. W.
Randolph Burgess (1936, p. 150), a long-time
official at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, argued the following:
The fundamental change which the Federal
Reserve System has made ... is to shift much of
the burden of meeting the fluctuations in the
demand for credit from the reserves of the
member banks in New York City to the twelve
Reserve Banks, which through the strength of
their holding of pooled reserves and through
their power of note issue and deposit expansion
can provide almost any extra funds required.
A member commercial bank could accommo-
date an increase in loan demand or currency
withdrawals by rediscounting eligible commer-
cial paper with its Federal Reserve Bank. The
Federal Reserve Bank would provide the com-
mercial bank with reserves or currency and
charge its discount rate.’
The provision of currency and reserves by
the Federal Reserve Banks was intended to be
largely automatic and self-regulating. Propo-
nents of the Real Bills Doctrine believed that the
quantities of currency and reserves provided by
the Fed would be sufficient but not inflationary
if supplied on the basis of short-term commer-
cial loans.~The Federal Reserve Banks were
authorized to rediscount commercial, agricultur-
al and industrial paper, bankers acceptances
used to finance foreign trade, and U.S. govern-
ment securities with maturities of up to three
months. Consistent with the Real Bills Doctrine,
Federal Reserve Banks were not authorized to
rediscount loans used to support purely finan-
cial activity, such as stock market call loans, be-
cause they were believed to be inflationary or
speculative.’ The Federal Reserve Banks set dis-
count rates, subject to approval by the Federal
Reserve Board, and generally supplied currency
and reserves elastically through the discount
window. The Federal Reserve Banks also sup-
plied reserves by purchasing bankers accep-
tances outright. They set buying rates and
purchased all acceptances that met minimum
quality standards, thus supplying reserves freely
at the buying rates.
Besides setting discount and acceptance buying
rates, the Federal Reserve Banks were permitted
to buy and sell U.S. government securities. The
Fed’s founders did not envision use of this
authorization to conduct monetary policy as we
‘A variety of currency substitutes were used during the
banking panics of the National Banking era. Loan certifi-
cates issued by clearinghouses have been the most
studied (see Dewald (1972], Timberlake (1984], Gorton
11985], and Dwyer and Gilbert (1989]). The Aldrich-Vreeland
Act of 1908 permitted bank associations to issue ‘emer-
gency currency” during panics, which in essence made le-
gal the earlier practice of issuing clearinghouse
certificates.
‘See Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 168-73), West (1977)
or Timberlake (1978, pp. 186-206) for discussions of the re-
form movement and analysis of various proposals.
‘The title of The Federal Reserve Act reads, “An Act to pro-
vide for the establishment of Federal Reserve Banks, to
furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscount-
ing commercial paper, to establish a more effective super-
vision of banking in the United States, and for other
purposes?’
‘This action was originally known as rediscounting because
commercial bank loans were often made on a discount ba-
sis; hence when they were endorsed by a commercial
bank and sent to a Federal Reserve Bank, they were redis-
counted by the Fed.
‘Because the Fed was required to maintain gold reserves
equal to a fraction of its deposit and note liabilities, the
gold standard ultimately constrained the growth of reserves
and currency. In practice, however the Fed maintained ex-
cess gold reserves, so the reserve requirement had little
effect on its operations before 1931.
‘Eligibility requirements were somewhat broadened in 1916
to include acceptances arising from domestic trade, and
Federal Reserve Banks were authorized to lend directly to
member banks on their own notes secured by eligible
paper. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (1943, pp. 325-26) for a summary ofthe types of
paper eligible for rediscount and for significant changes in
eligibility rules from 1914 to 1933.0
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The Accommodation of Currency Demand
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know it today, however, but rather to provide
the Federal Reserve Banks with an additional
means of generating revenue. The use of mone-
tary policy to influence economic activity and
the price level and for other general purposes
evolved slowly, and open market operations
were not important until the mid.1920s.bo
In accommodating the demands of commercial
banks, Federal Reserve credit tended to increase
in the spring and autumn months, when com-
mercial loan demand peaked, and again in De-
cember, with increased holiday demand for
currency. After the holidays, currency returned
to banks and credit demand declined as it did
during the summer. Federal Reserve credit
tended to decline in winter and summer months.
After the Fed’s establishment, the behavior of
short-term interest rates changed dramatically.
Before 1914, rates had a distinct seasonal
pattern—high in the autumn and
during the winter and summer.
Burgess (1936, p. 204):
(M)oney rates fluctuated much more rapidly
and widely before the Federal Reserve System
was established. -.-In January and February
money tended to be easy. In the early spring
rates rose, as the demand for funds increased
with the planting of crops and spring trade.
Towards summer rates fell, but rose again to
the year’s high point in the autumn with har-
vesting and autumn trade. They continued
generally high throughout the holiday period
with its heavy currency requirements. --
Since the establishment of the Reserve System,
such seasonal swings of interest rates have
been almost though not quite eliminated.
Burgess (p. 206) goes on to write, “The explana-
tion of the change which has taken place is
found largely in the credit elasticity provided by
the Reserve System.” Other writers have recog-
nized the Fed’s influence on the pattern of rates,
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 292—93), for
example, conclude the following:
‘t’he Federal Reserve ‘sterilized,’ as it were,
seasonal withdrawals and returns of currency
and thereby kept deposits of member banks at
105ee Chandler (1958), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Wick-
er (1966) and Wheelock (1991, 1992) for discussion of the
evolution of monetary policy and the Fed’s objectives dur-
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According toFigure 2
The Seasonal Pattern of the Call Loan Rate
Monthly Deviationsfrom Annual Mean
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the Reserve Banks largely, though not entirely,
free of seasonal movements. The effect was to
change the pre-1914 seasonal patterns notably,
‘The seasonal pattern in currency outside the
Treasury was widened, the seasonal pattern in
call money rates narrowed. The System was
almost entirely successful in the stated objective
of eliminating seasonal strain.
‘Fhe contribution the Federal Reserve made to
accommodating seasonal (and nonseasonal) cur-
rency detnands is illustrated in figure 1.” Feder-
al Reserve credit and currency in circulation
tended to move together, Federal Reserve credit
is a source of bank reserves, so by extending
Fed credit when currency was withdrawn from
banks, the Fed reduced fluctuations in member
bank reserves.12
‘l’he seasonal pattern of interest rates changed
after the Fed opened in November 1914, Figure
2 shows the estimated seasonal patterns of the
call loan renewal interest rate between January
1890 and October 1914 and between November
1914 and December 1933.” In the earlier period
the interest rate fluctuated much more widely
during the year than it did after the Fed’s
founding. Many studies, using a variety of statis-
tical techniques, confirm the apparent decrease
in seasonal amplitude illustrated here.14 Scholars
debate whether the Federal Reserve was respon-
‘1The data plotted in figure 1 are monthly averages of daily
figures. The source for these data is the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System (1943, pp. 369-71),
l2As discussed later, this study begins its analysis in 1919
because there is controversy about the Fed’s effects in its
early years and because of the disruptions caused by the
Fed’s contribution to financing World War I.
“The plotted seasonal patterns are simply the monthly aver-
ages of the rate less the annual mean, after subtracting a
time trend- The patterns are calculated from a linear
regression of the interest rate on monthly dummy variables
and a time trend, which included an AR(2) error process
and was estimated using maximum likelihood, It might be
argued that it would be more appropriate to examine the
behavior of real interest rates because the underlying
sources of seasonal credit and currency demands are real
phenomena. Miron (1986) argues, however, that nominal
rates should reflect the extent of the Fed’s seasonal ac-
commodation, and most studies have focused exclusively
on the behavior of nominal rates.
14See Shiller (1980), Clark (1986), Miron (1986), Mankiw, Mi-
ron, and Well (1987), Fishe and Wohar (1990), Canova












~i4193~sible for this change, particularly before the end
of World War 1,15 Researchers generally agree,
however, that the evidence for a significant Fed
role after World War I is strong. Clearly the
Fed intended to accommodate seasonal currency
and credit demands, as the following statement
of Reserve Bank policy in the first Annual
Report of the Federal Reserve Board (1914, p. 17)
indicates: “The more complete adaptation of the
credit mechanism and facilities of the country
to the needs of industry, commerce, and
agriculture—with all their seasonal fluctuations
and contingencies—should be the constant aim




The elasticity of currency and reserves sup-
plied by the Fed and the near elimination of
seasonal fluctuations in interest rates successful-
ly eliminated financial crises — or so it appeared
until 1929. From the Fed’s founding until the
stock market crash, no crises or banking panics
occurred despite a significant recession in 1921,
minor recessions in 1924 and 1927, and 5,700
bank failures during the 1920s.
In the following passage Burgess (1927, p. 122)
noted that Fed operations apparently eliminated
financial panics:
In the old days there were rigid and not far
distant limits to the reserves available; now the
mechanism of the Reserve System provides for
a much larger possible expansion. It gives much
greater elasticity - ---This elasticity results in
much more stability of rates and practically
eliminates the fear of money panic -
Burgess argued further that, “The presence of
the Reserve System gives greater elasticity to
the supply of funds and stability to the money
market and removes the fear of money panics”
(p. 125)17 Miron (1986, p. 136) also concludes
“that the Fed successfully eliminated financial
panics from 1915 to 1928.” Based on historical
experience, he calculates that the probability of
there being no financial crises in a 14-year peri-
od (for example, from 1915 to 1928) is .005.
Like Miron (1986), other researchers have
concluded that the crises of the Great Depres-
sion resulted from a distinct change in Federal
Reserve policy. Following Friedman and Schwartz
(1963), Miron attributes the change in policy to
the death of Benjamin Strong, governor of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the
Fed’s leading policymaker, in October 1928.
Other researchers, such as Trescott (1982) and
Hamilton (1987), also conclude that nionetary
policy changed significantly with, or just before,
the onset of the Depression.” The remainder of
this article examines whether there was a
change in Federal Reserve accommodation of
seasonal currency and credit demands that
could explain the reappearance of financial
crises beginning in October 1929,
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How did the Federal Reserve accommodate
seasonal currency and credit demands during
the Great Depression? A review of the Fed’s
methods indicates that the Fed was largely pas-
sive in this accommodation, suggesting that any
apparent change in the seasonal pattern of Fed-
eral Reserve credit was more likely due to
changes in demand than to a deliberate policy
decision,
“Miron (1986) and Mankiw, Miron and Weil (1987) argue
strongly that Federal Reserve operations caused the
seasonal fluctuations in short-term nominal interest rates to
decline after 1914. Clark (1966), however, contends that a
lowering of reserve requirements, which occurred simul-
taneously with the Fed’s opening, and gold inflows accom-
panying the start of World War I are more likely causes of
the reduced seasonal pattern of interest rates in the United
States between 1914 and 1917. Fishe (1991) also reaches
this conclusion, finding little seasonal behavior before 1917
in any variable under the Fed’s control. Holland and Toma
(1991) argue, however, that the Fed’s presence as lender of
last resort may have made banks more willing to lend in
seasons during which credit demand was high and thus
might have caused a reduction in interest rate seasonality
even though there was little seasonal behavior in Federal
Reserve credit until the 1920s.
“The Federal Reserve continues to accommodate seasonal
variation in money and credit demands. The Fed uses
open market operations to remove seasonal changes in the
money stock, and its seasonal borrowing program permits
special discount window access to banks that experience
large seasonal fluctuations in loan demand. See Clark
(1992) for a discussion of this program.
“In the second edition of Burgess’ book (1936, p. 156), pub-
lished after the financial crises of the Great Depression,
both of these sections were changed. The latter was modi-
fied to read “The presence of the Reserve System gives
greater elasticity to the supply of funds — and the control
of that elasticity is the central problem of Federal Reserve
policy.”
“Specifically, Trescott dates the change in policy to early
1930, when the Fed’s open market committee was reor-
ganized; Hamilton dates the policy change to December
1927, when the Fed adopted a restrictive policy to combat
stock market speculation. Other studies, however, have
concluded that there was no fundamental change in Feder-
al Reserve policy at this time. This debate is examined in
Wheelock (1991, 1992),Figure 3
Federal Reserve Discount and Acceptance Buying Rates
Percent
The Fed had the following three main policy
tools during the 1920s and early 1930s: the dis-
count rate, the acceptance buying rate and
open market operations in U.S. government
securities,” The Fed was established to provide
currency and bank reserves to accommodate
the needs of commerce. By specifying eligibility
requirements for the paper that could be redis-
counted or purchased, the Fed’s founders in-
tended to limit policymakers’ discretion, as well
as to accommodate currency and credit de-
mands without fueling inflation or speculation.
Only in open market operations in govern-
ment securities did the Fed determine the
specific volume of its operations. The Fed was
generally passive in supplying currency and
bank reserves through the discount window
and by purchasing acceptances.2°The Federal
Reserve could of course affect the volume of
discount loans and acceptance purchases by al-
tering the discount and acceptance buying rates,
but neither rate had a seasonal pattern (see
figure 3)21 Apparently the Fed did not alter its
rates to influence seasonal changes in discount-
window borrowing or in its acceptance hold-
ings, although it may have altered rates for
other reasons. The three panels of figure 4 plot
Federal Reserve credit outstanding and its prin-
cipal components. Each component had a
statistically significant seasonal pattern, but
changes in the Fed’s acceptance portfolio and in
discount loans were the principal causes of
seasonal variation in total Fed credit outstand-
ing, The only component whose volume the Fed
controlled directly—the government security
“The Fed did not have the power to alter reserve require-
ments until 1933,
20Burgess (1936, p. 42).
211 regressed each rate on a time trend and monthly dummy
variables, and each regression included an AR(2) error
process. Neither rate nor its first difference had a statisti-
cally significant seasonal pattern. An F-test of the null
hypothesis that the coefficients on the monthly dummies
equal zero cannot be rejected for either rate or its first
difference, The source of these data is Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (1943, pp. 439-45), For
months in which a rate changed, I computed a monthly
average by weighting the rate by the number of days it was
in effect.
1919 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 1933Figure 4
Fed Credit Outstanding and Its Principal
Components
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portfolio—had the least seasonal pattern. The
absence of seasonal changes in the discount and
acceptance buying rates and the minimal contri-
bution of open market operations in govern-
ment securities to the seasonal pattern of
Federal Reserve credit indicate that the Fed’s ac-
commodation of seasonal currency and credit
demands was largely passive. It seems likely
therefore that a shift in demand, rather than a
deliberate policy action affecting supply, ex-
plains any change in the seasonal behavior of
Federal Reserve credit outstanding.22
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The reappearance of financial crises in 1929
at times of the year when credit and currency
demands reached seasonal peaks suggests that
the Fed might have reduced its accommodation
of seasonal demands, Miron (1986) contends that
this was true because he finds that the seasonal
fluctuations of Federal Reserve credit were some-
what less pronounced between 1929 and 1933
than they had been between 1922 and 1928.
Miron estimates the seasonal pattern of Feder-
al Reserve credit by calculating the uncondition-
al mean of Fed credit in each month after
subtracting a time trend. A convenient way of
doing this is to regr’ess the series on monthly
dummy variables and a time trend. Miron finds
that the range and standard deviation of the es-
timated dummy variable coefficients are smaller
in the 1929—33 period than in the 1922—28 peri-
od and infers that Federal Beserve credit had
less seasonal variation during the Depression
than it had previously.23 He concludes therefore
that the Fed was less accommodative of seasonal
demands after 1928 than it was before 1928.
Using Miron’s methodology but estimating the
pre-Depression seasonal pattern over a some-
what longer period (1919—28), I find that Feder-
al Reserve credit actually had greater seasonal
amplitude during the Depression years. Figure 5
plots the seasonal patterns of Federal Reserve
22Federal Reserve credit also included a miscellaneous com-
ponent that was mainly float, which averaged about 4 per-
cent of total Fed credit outstanding. This component was
also somewhat seasonal and, like discount loans and ac-
ceptances, was influenced more by the level of economic
activity than by Fed policy.
23Miron does not test whether the changes are statistically
significant.
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Figure 5
The Seasonal Pattern of Federal Reserve Credit
Monthly Deviations from Annual Mean
Millions of dollars











credit between 1919 and 1928 and between
1929 and 1933.24 These data do not suggest a
decline in Fed accommodation after 1928.
Table I presents evidence on the statistical
significance of the seasonal patterns of Federal
Reserve credit and its chief components—the
Fed’s acceptance holdings, discount window
loans and government security holdings. Con-
tinuing with Miron’s methodology, I estimate
the seasonal patterns of each series and the
change (first difference) of each series as the
average values for each month after removing
any time trend. These averages are simply the
estimated coefficients from a regression of each
variable on monthly dummy variables and, for
the non-differenced data, a time trend.25 The
seasonal pattern is statistically significant if the
null hypothesis that the estimated monthly dum-
my coefficients equal zero can be rejected. Ta-
ble I reports the test statistics for this hypothe-
sis. Between 1919 and 1928, Federal Reserve
credit and each component had statistically sig-
nificant seasonal patterns.2” Between 1929 and
1933, however, only the Fed’s government secu-
rity portfolio had a statistically significant
seasonal pattern. ‘rhese tests appear to suggest
that the Fed was less accommodative of seasonal
demands during the Depression. The smaller
F-statistic values for Fed accommodation of
seasonal demands during the Depression are not,
however, necessarily evidence of less seasonality
because with fewer observations the seasonal
patterns are estimated less precisely. ‘rhus the
conclusions drawn from them are less certain.
24The figure plots the estimated dummy coefficient for each
month less the average of the 12 estimated coefficients. In
addition to the dummy variables, the model includes a
time trend and an AR(2) error process (which was suggest-
ed by standard model selection criterion) and was estimat-
ed using maximum likelihood.
25Model selection criterion suggested the use of an AR(2) er-
ror process in modeling Federal Reserve credit and an
AR(3) process for each component. I used AR(1) for the
change in Federal Reserve credit and AR(2) for the
changes in each component. I also estimated models for
the difference in the logs of each variable. The results for
these models are identical to those of the first-difference
models.
“Because researchers who argue that Fed policy changed
do not agree on the date of this change, I chose to follow
Miron 0986) and break the sample at December 1928.
Breaking the sample at December 1927, however does not
qualitatively change the results.
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Significance of Seasonal Patterns in Federal Reserve Credit
and its Components (F-Test Statistics)
January 1919— January 1929— January 1929—
December 1928 December 1933 September 1931
Federal Reserve credit 23.48” 0.99 3.47”
Acceptances 4.10” 179 1.90
Discount loans 542” 1.04 124
Government securities 4.02” 2.02 254
Change in Federal Reserve credit 25.00” 115 4.59”
Change in acceptances 426” 1.47 2.29
Change in discount loans 5.70” 0.90 1.55
Change in government securities 3.08” 1.71 2.07
- Statistically significant at the .05 level.
Statistically significant at the .01 level.
Data source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943). pp. 369-71. The data are
monthly averages of daily figures
Table 2
Stability of Seasonal Patterns in Federal Reserve Credit and
its Components, December 1928 Breakpoint (F-Test Statistics)
January 1919— January 1919—
December 1933 September 1931
Federal Reserve credit 1.02 1.55
Acceptances 1.68 2.61”
Discount loans 1.24 1.02
Government securities 0.70 079
Change in Federal Reserve credit 1.17 1.53
Change in acceptances 2 04’ 2 84”
Change in discount loans 133 092
Change in government securities 1.13 0.98
• Statistically significant at th
•‘Statistically significant at th
e .05 level.
e .01 level.Table 3
Stability of Seasonal Patterns in Federal Reserve Credit and
its Components (Standard Deviations of Monthly Dummy
Coefficients)
January 1919— January 1929— January 1929—
December 1928 December 1933 September 1931
Federal Reserve credit 75.41 116.69 139.02
Acceptances 4752 65.38 72.74
Discount loans 34.58 4791 64.39
Government securities 1088 47.94 41.34
Change in Federal Reserve credit 50.19 9084 78.63
Change in acceptances 27.79 4701 48.62
Change in discount loans 22.13 56.16 24.95
Change in governmenl securities 16.04 29.97 33.17
The results of further tests for a change in are, however, not statisliially significant.29 Thus
the Fed’s seasonal accommodation are presented these data do not support the hypothesis that
in table 2 and table 3. Table 2 summarizes tests the Fed was less concerned with seasonal credit
to determine whether seasonal patterns of Fed and currency demands during the Depression
credit and its components before December than it had been earlier.
1928 were significantly different from seasonal Federal Reserve credit outstanding was sub-
patterns after December 1928. Except for the .ject to large and erratic fluctuations during the
change tn the Fed s acceptance holdings, these Great Depression (see figure 1). In particular, a
tests indicate no change in seasonal patterns.27
pronounced change in its behavior appears to
- have occurred in late 1931, suggesting that in-
Table 3 reports the standard deviations of the
-- . ferences drawn from analysis of Fed credit over
monthly dummy coefficients for each variable . , ..
the entire 1929-33 period might be misleading.
in each period.28 Miron (1988) concluded that
the Fed was less accommodative during the On September 21, 1931, Great Britain stopped
Depression in part because the standard devia- converting pounds sterling into gold. Fears that
tion of the seasonal pattern of Fed credit was the United States would soon follow Britain off
smaller between 1929 and 1933 than it had the gold standard led to a large withdrawal of
been between 1922 and 1928. Although compar- foreign deposits from U.S. banks and a conse-
ing the standard deviations of the seasonal pat- quent gold outflow. The U.S. monetary gold
terns is not a statistically rigorous test, it does stock declined 15 percent in the six weeks after
provide evidence that the seasonal variability of Britain’s action.’°Domestic depositors also
each series increased or decreased over time. panicked and converted deposits into currency.
The standard deviation of the seasonal coeffi- Member banks partially offset the reserve
cients for Fed credit and each component is drains caused by the gold and currency out-
larger for the Depression years than it had flows by selling acceptances to the Fed and by
been between 1919 and 1928. The differences borrowing at the discount window. Federal
271f December 1927 is used as the breakpoint, the results “The standard deviations for 1928-33 are also larger than
are identical to those reported in table 2, except that the those for 1919-27, but the differences are again not statisti-
first difference of the Fed’s acceptance holdings had a sta- cally significant. The specific test employed is a Wald test
ble seasonal pattern, of the equality of the variances of the monthly dummy
‘°Theseare simply the standard deviations of the point esti- coefficients across the two periods. I thank Joe Ritter for
mates of the seasonal dummy coefficients and should not suggesting this test.
be confused with the standard errors of the coefficient es- 30Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943,
timates. p. 386).14
Reserve credit outstanding rose $959 million (75
percent) between September 16 and October
21.” The increase in Fed credit outstanding was
not enough, however, to prevent a substantial
decline in bank reserves.32
Federal Reserve credit outstanding declined
somewhat in early 1932 but began to rise in
March 1932 with what was then the Fed’s lar-
gest program of open-market purchases of
government securities.” From March 1932 to
August 1932 the Fed bought more than $1 bil-
lion of securities, and these purchases probably
explain the atypical mid-year rise in Federal
Reserve credit in 1932.
The events of late 1931 and 1932 appear to
have altered the pattern of Federal Reserve
credit. The evidence reported in table 1 indi-
cates that although Fed credit did not have a
statistically significant seasonal pattern between
1929 and 1933 as a whole, it did have one be-
tween January 1929 and September 1931. Thus
if a change in the seasonal behavior of Federal
Reserve credit occurred during the Depression,
it was more likely to have occurred after Sep-
tember 1931 than before September 1931. This
is important because three of the five financial
crises of the Depression occurred before this
date and thus cannot be attributed to a possible
change in Federal Reserve seasonal policy in
September 1931.
Statistical tests to determine whether the sea-
sonal patterns of Federal Reserve credit and its
components changed between the January 1919—
December 1928 and January 1929—September
1931 periods also suggest no shift in seasonal
policy before September 1931. Only in the case
of the Fed’s acceptance holdings is it possible to
reject the null hypothesis that no change in
seasonal patterns occurred (see table 2). Com-
parison of the standard deviations of the
seasonal patterns also casts doubt on the view
that the Fed was less accommodative of
seasonal demands before late 1931 (see table 3)34
The period from September 1931 to December
1933 is too short and was too volatile to deter-
mine seasonal monetary policy, and the data af-
ter 1933 contain no information about accommo-
dation of seasonal demands. The crisis following
Britain’s departure from the gold standard, the
Fed’s large open-market purchases in 1932, the
collapse of the banking system and the bank holi-
day in March 1933 all had unusually large effects
on Federal Reserve credit. After 1933 gold and
currency inflows allowed banks to accumulate
large excess reserve holdings, which virtually
eliminated the demand for Fed credit. Accord-
ingly, Federal Reserve credit and its components
varied little from 1934 until World War II.
TilE SEASONAL BEhAVIOR OF
INTER.EST R.ATE:S
This section examines the extent of change in
the seasonal behavior of short-term interest
rates before and during the Great Depression.
By supplying currency and reserves in response
to seasonal demands, the Federal Reserve, at
least by 1919, had substantially reduced the
seasonal amplitude of interest rates. If the Fed
reduced its accommodation of seasonal demands
during the Depression, it seems likely that in-
terest rates would have become more seasonal.
Table 4 summarizes tests to determine
whether three short-term interest rates had
statistically significant seasonal patterns.’5 The
commercial paper rate had a statistically signifi-
cant seasonal pattern between 1919 and 1928.
The bankers acceptance and call loan rates,
however, did not have statistically significant
seasonal patterns. None of the rates had a
statistically significant seasonal pattern during
the Depression, neither during the January
1929—December 1933 period nor during the
January 1929—September 1931 period.36
Table 5 reports tests of the stability of the
seasonal patterns of each interest rate. Although
“Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943,
p. 386).
“The Fed argued that it lacked sufficient gold reserves to
purchase government securities in sufficient quantities to
prevent reserves from declining. Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) contend that the Fed did have sufficient reserves
and in any event had the authority to suspend its reserve
requirement temporarily. Wicker (1966), however, argues
that Fed officials feared that security purchases would indi-
cate an unwillingness to defend the dollar’s value and ex-
acerbate the gold outflow. See Wheelock (1991, 1992) for
further discussion.
the Fed to use government securities to partially back its
liabilities.
‘4The differences in the standard deviations between the
January 1919—December 1928 and January 1929—September
1931 periods are not statistically significant. The findings
are not affected if December 1927 is used as the break
point.
‘5Specifically, I test the null hypothesis that the coefficients
on the monthly dummy variables all equal zero.
‘°Thecall loan rate did have a statistically significant
seasonal pattern between January 1919 and December
1927. The regressions for the level of each rate included an
AR(2) error process, and those for the first difference of
each rate included an AR(1) error process.
“The Fed’s gold reserve requirement was relaxed signifi-
cantly by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, which permittedTable 4
Significance of Seasonal Patterns in Short-Term Interest
Rates (F-Test Statistics)
January 1919— January 1929— January 1929—
December 1928 December 1933 September 1931
Commercial paper rate 2.94’ 1.29 1.23
Call loan rate 1.44 1.35 1.16
Bankers acceptance rate 1.19 1.46 1.29
Change in commercial paper rate 2.78” 0.82 0.88
Change in call loan rate 1.33 1.16 101
Change in bankers acceptance rate 0.86 1.10 0.96
- Statist~callysgnificant at the .05 level.
Statistically significant at the 01 level.
Data source Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943). pp. 450-51 The data
are monthly averages of daily figures.
Table 5
Stability of Seasonal Patterns in Short-Term Interest Rates,
December 1928 Breakpoint (F-Test Statistics)
January 1919— January 1919—
December 1933 September 1931
Commercial paper rate 092 147
Call loan rate 1.46 1 23
Bankers accepiance rate 1.21 1 20
Change .n commercial paper rate 1.05 1.73
Change n call loan rate 164 1.68
Change n bancers acceptance ‘ate 141 1
Stat:st;cally siqnilicant at the 05 leve:
Statist.cally s~gnificantat the 0’ ieveiTable 6
Stability of Seasonal Patterns in Short-Term Interest Rates







no rate had a statistically significant seasonal
pattern during the Depression, the null hypothe-
sis that the seasonal pattern was stable is ac-
cepted in all cases at conventional levels of
significance. Finally table 6 reports the standard
deviations of the seasonal dummy coefficients
from each regression. For each rate and the
change in each rate, the standard deviations are
larger for the 1929—33 period than for the
1919—28 period. The standard deviations of the
seasonal dummy coefficients are also higher
during the January 1929—September 1931 peri-
od than during the January 1919—December
1928 period. Thus, as with Federal Reserve
credit and its components, comparison of the
standard deviations suggests that the interest
rates might have fluctuated somewhat more
widely across seasons during the Depression
than before it. However, none of the changes in
the standard deviations is statistically significant.
To put the possible increase in the seasonal
pattern of interest rates during the Depression
in perspective, figure 6 plots the estimated
coefficients on the monthly dummy variables
for the call loan renewal rate between 1919 and
1928 and between 1929 and 1933. I use the
same scale as in figure 2, where these coeffi-
cients are plotted for the 1890—1914 and
1914—33 periods. Comparison of the two figures
shows that the increase in the seasonal ampli-
tude of the call loan rate during the Depression
was small relative to the decline in amplitude in
1914.” For comparison, the standard deviation
of the seasonal pattern of the call loan rate be-
tween January 1890 and October 1914 is 1.02
(0.67 for the first difference of the call loan
rate). For the November 1914—December 1933
period the standard deviation is 0.16 (0.13 for
the first difference). The increases in the stan-
dard deviations after December 1928 are thus
quite small in comparison with the size of the
changes in November 1914. The levels of the
standard deviations during the Depression are
also small in comparison with those in the
pre—November 1914 period.’~The various evi-
dence that interest rates were more seasonal
during the Depression is ambiguous. The possi-
ble increase in the seasonal pattern of interest
rates after 1929, however, seems too small to
conclude that unaccommodated seasonal curren-
cy and credit demands caused the return of
financial crises during the Depression.
Proponents of banking reform in the United
States in the early 20th century noted that
financial crises tended to occur in months when
currency and credit demands reached seasonal
peaks. Eliminating crises was a principal goal of
the founders of the Federal Reserve System,
and they designed methods of accommodating
“The months in which the call loan rate reached seasonal
peaks between 1929 and 1933 do not coincide with those
between 1919 and 1928. The behavior of the call loan rate
probably changed markedly after the stock market crash in
1929. Similar plots for the commercial paper and bankers
acceptance rates show that the seasonal high and low
months for these rates remained the same across periods.
“Because the United States did not have an active bankers
acceptance market before 1914, it is impossible to make a
similar comparison for the bankers acceptance rate.
Commercial paper 006 0.16 0.12
Call loan rate a24 0.26 0.47
Bankers acceptance rate 0.09 0.26 0.13
Change in commercial paper rate 0.08 0.14 0.12
Change in call loan rate 0.20 032 043
Change In bankers acceptance rate 006 022 015Figure 6
The Seasonal Pattern of the Call Loan Rate
Monthly Deviations from Annual Mean
Percent
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currency and credit demands to accomplish that
objective. Federal Reserve credit outstanding
rose and fell with fluctuations in currency and
loan demands, and the Fed’s presence appears
to have substantially reduced seasonal fluctua-
tions in bank reserves and interest rates. Most
important, until 1929 it appeared that the Fed’s
presence had eliminated financial crises.
The reappearance of financial crises during
the Great Depression suggests the possibility
that the Fed accommodated seasonal currency
and credit demands less in those years than it
had between 1914 and 1928. This article shows,
however, that the Fed’s accommodation of
seasonal demands was generally passive, occur-
ring mainly through discount loans and accep-
tance purchases. ‘there was no seasonal pattern
in the Fed’s discount and acceptance buying
rates. Commercial banks initiated most seasonal
extensions of Fed credit, suggesting that changes
in demand, rather than deliberate policy deci-
sions, caused any apparent changes in the
seasonal pattern of Fed credit. In addition, Fed-
eral Reserve credit and its components do not
appear to have been less seasonal during the
Depression, at least not before September 1931,
than they had been during the 1920s. And
although the seasonal pattern of interest rates
during the Great Depression may have in-
creased slightly, the seasonal fluctuations re-
mained trivial compared with those that
occurred before 1914. The Fed’s failure to pre-
vent banking panics and declines in bank
reserves and the money supply during the
Great Depression was a serious error. It ap-
pears unlikely, however, that the financial crises
of the Great Depression were caused by a
change in the seasonal policies of the Federal
Reserve System.
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